Friday, 20 July 2018

Details of 2015 Naga agreement emerge

Framework agreement’ recognises uniqueness of Naga history.

The government has informed a Parliamentary panel that it signed a framework agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) after it agreed on a settlement within the Indian federation with a “special status.”

R. N. Ravi, interlocutor for the Naga talks, told the committee that it was a departure from their earlier position of “with India, not within India,” and that the government called it a framework agreement and signed it. This is the first time that details of the agreement signed at the residence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 3, 2015, have emerged.

The details are part of the 213th report on the security situation in the Northeastern states tabled by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs in the Rajya Sabha on Thursday. The committee was also informed that the “contours” had not been spelt out in the framework agreement that was “just about the recognition of the uniqueness of the Naga history by the Government of India”, and some special arrangements will have to be made for the Nagas.

“On being asked what the special arrangement will be, the Committee was told that with respect to Nagaland...Article 371A of the Constitution makes it clear that they are special and a special status has been accorded to them. A similar kind of status, with some local variation, and some change to the Nagas in the neighbouring States can be explored,” the report said. According to the report, Mr. Ravi also informed the committee that the Nagas had now reached a common understanding with the government that “boundaries of the States will not be touched” and “some special arrangements would be made for the Nagas, wherever they are.”

“The Interlocutor apprised the committee about the broad status of the negotiations that boundaries of any State will neither be changed nor altered. Initially, the Nagas had stuck to the idea of unification of Naga inhabited areas, resolutely maintaining their stand of ‘no integration, no solution.’ However, they have now reached a common understanding with the Government that boundaries of States will not be touched,” the report said. The NSCN-IM has been fighting for ‘Greater Nagaland’ or Nagalim — it wants to extend Nagaland's borders by including Naga-dominated areas in neighbouring Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, to unite 1.2 million Nagas. The Chief Ministers of the three States have warned against any tinkering with its boundaries.

“While briefing the committee, R. N. Ravi, interlocutor for Nagas, stated that the Government has been talking with the NSCN-IM for the last 20 years and their position from the very beginning has been that Nagas were exceptional, Nagas were not Indians, Nagas were sovereign and any settlement could be reached only on the basis of the fact that this is a settlement between two sovereigns“During the course of the last several years, the Government started opening out and reaching out to civil society organisations, Naga tribal bodies and other stakeholders other than the NSCN-IM,” the report said.

Getting the language count right

Getting the language count right

G.N. Devy

JULY 19, 2018 00:02 IST

UPDATED: JULY 18, 2018 23:11 IST

Recent Census data appear to inadequately reflect India’s linguistic composition, and are inconsistent with global ideas

The story, “Death of Jagmohan, the Elephant”, by Bengali writer Mahasweta Devi, is about the death of an elephant. For a reader, the story may appear to be about a rather “big death”, but what the writer wanted to say was that there are also many “small deaths”. They include the deaths of Dalits and tribals who are trapped by hunger and humiliation. Anonymity surrounds them and our lack of compassion gives them finality.

The death of a tree or a forest sacrificed at the altar of development is mourned but not spoken about. Similarly, the death of a language is literally shrouded in silence. Because of its nature, a language is not visible and fails to move anyone except its very last speaker who nurtures an unrequited hope of a response. When a language disappears it goes forever, taking with it knowledge gathered over centuries. With it goes a unique world view. This too is a form of violence. Large parts of culture get exterminated through slight shifts in policy instruments than through armed conflicts. Just as nature’s creations do not require a tsunami to destroy them, the destruction of culture can be caused by something as small as a bureaucrat’s benign decision. Even a well-intentioned language census can do much damage.

Over the last many decades, successive governments have carried out a decadal census. The 1931 Census was a landmark as it held up a mirror to the country about the composition of caste and community. War disrupted the exercise in 1941, while it was a rather busy year for the new Indian republic at the time of the 1951 Census It was during the 1961 census that languages in the country were enumerated in full. India learnt that a a total of 1,652 mother tongues were being spoken. Using ill-founded logic, this figure was pegged at only 109, in the 1971 Census. The logic was that a language deserving respectability should not have less than 10,000 speakers. This had no scientific basis nor was it a fair decision but it has stuck and the practice continues to be followed.

Hits and misses

The language enumeration takes place in the first year of every decade. The findings are made public about seven years later as the processing of language data is far more time consuming than handling economic or scientific data. Early this month, the Census of India made public the language data based on the 2011 Census, which took into account 120 crore speakers of a very large number of languages. The Language division of the Census office deserves praise but the data presented leaves behind a trail of questions.

During the census, citizens submitted 19,569 names of mother tongues — technically called “raw returns”. Based on previous linguistic and sociological information, the authorities decided that of these, 18,200 did not match “logically” with known information. A total of 1,369 names — technically called “labels” — were picked as “being names of languages”. The “raw returns” left out represent nearly 60 lakh citizens. And because of the classification regime, their linguistic citizenship has been dropped.

In addition to the 1,369 “mother tongue” names shortlisted, there were 1,474 other mother tongue names. These were placed under the generic label “Others”. As far as the Census is concerned, these linguistic “Others” are not seen to be of any concern. But the fact is that they have languages of their own. The classification system has not been able to identify what or which languages these are and so they have been silenced by having an innocuous label slapped on them.

The 1,369 have been grouped further under a total of 121 “group labels”, which have been presented as “Languages”. Of these, 22 are languages included in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, called “Scheduled Languages”. The remainder, 99, are “Non-scheduled Languages”. An analysis shows that most of the groupings are forced. For instance, under the heading “Hindi”, there are nearly 50 other languages. Bhojpuri (spoken by more than 5 crore people, and with its own cinema, theatre, literature, vocabulary and style) comes under “Hindi”. Under Hindi too is the nearly 3 crore population from Rajasthan with its own independent languages. The Powari/Pawri of tribals in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh too has been added. Even the Kumauni of Uttarakhand has been yoked to Hindi. While the report shows 52,83,47,193 individuals speaking Hindi as their mother tongue, this is not so. There is a similar and inflated figure for Sanskrit by counting the returns against the question about a person’s “second language”.

English use

As against this, the use of English is not seen through the perspective of a second language. Counting for this is restricted to the “mother tongue” category — in effect bringing down the figure substantially. Given the widespread use of English in education, law, administration, media and health care, a significant number of Indians use English as a utility language. To some extent it is the language of integration in our multilingual country. Therefore, isn’t the Census required to capture this reality? It can, given the data on the language of second preference, but it does not for reasons that need no spelling out. So the Census informs us that a total of 2,59,678 Indians speak English as their “mother tongue” — numerically accurate and semantically disastrous.

The language Census may not attract as much attention as news about fuel prices. But in the community of nations, the Indian census is bound to be discussed. A body such as UNESCO will look at it with interest. From the 1940s, when its General Council decided to establish a Translation Bureau to years later, in 2008, when its Executive Board debated “Multilingualism in the Context of Education for All”, UNESCO has progressively developed its vision and deepened its understanding of global linguistic diversity.

Focus points

From time to time, UNESCO tries to highlight the key role that language plays in widening access to education, protecting livelihoods and preserving culture and knowledge traditions. In 1999/2000, it proclaimed and observed February 21 as International Mother Language Day, while in 2001 the ‘Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity’ accepted the principle of “Safeguarding the linguistic heritage of humanity and giving support to expression, creation and dissemination in the greatest possible number of languages.” In pursuit of these, UNESCO has launched a linguistic diversity network and supported research. It has also brought out an Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger, which highlights the central place of language in the world’s heritage. Is our language census consistent with these ideas and principles?

One expects that the Census in India should adequately reflect the linguistic composition of the country. It is not good practice when data helps neither educators nor policy makers or the speakers of languages themselves. The Census, a massive exercise that consumes so much time and energy, needs to see how it can help in a greater inclusion of the marginal communities, how our intangible heritage can be preserved, and how India’s linguistic diversity can become an integral part of our national pride.

G.N. Devy is a literary critic and a cultural activist. E-mail: ganesh_devy@yahoo.com

Tuesday, 8 March 2016

Taliban rejects peace talks with govt.

Taliban rejects peace talks with govt.
·         The Taliban on Saturday refused to hold direct peace talks with the Afghan government, dealing a blow to international efforts to revive long-stalled negotiations aimed at ending the deadly 14- year insurgency.
·         The statement, which comes as face-to-face talks were expected to start in Islamabad this week, stressed longstanding preconditions for dialogue, including the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
·         The Taliban’s seemingly intractable position follows a string of military victories for the insurgent group after NATO formally ended its combat operations more than a year ago.
·         The announcement marks a setback in efforts by Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the U.S. to restart negotiations aimed at ending the insurgency.
·         Delegates from the four countries had met in Kabul late February for a fourth round of talks aimed at reviving the nascent peace process, which stalled last summer. The quartet had called for a direct dialogue between the Taliban and Kabul by this week, a deadline that some analysts called “completely unrealistic”.
·         “We unequivocally state that the esteemed leader of Islamic Emirate [Taliban] has not authorised anyone to participate in this meeting and neither has the Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate decided to partake in it,” the Taliban statement added.
·         The group also accused the U.S. of duplicity, saying it had boosted troop numbers, in- creased air strikes and night raids against the insurgents in tandem with its efforts to re- vive talks. The Taliban have also stepped up attacks on government and foreign targets in Afghanistan - even in the winter months when fighting usually abates - underscoring a worsening security situation.
·         Afghan security forces have suffered record casualties since NATO ended its combat mission in December 2014, leaving them to battle the resurgent Taliban largely on their own.
·         In recent months the Taliban briefly captured the northern city of Kunduz, the first urban     centre to fall to the insurgents, and have seized territory in the opium-growing southern province of Helmand.
·         Observers say the intensifying insurgency highlights a push by the militants to seize more territory in an attempt to wrangle greater concessions if and when the talks resume.

Sunday, 18 January 2015

Over the Barrel: Oilpolitik

A frequently asked but futile question
is: Where are oil prices headed? The
question is futile because no one
knows the answer.
This does not mean that people do
not analyse and speculate. It is just
that they get it wrong more often
than not. The more useful questions
would be: What are the implications
of the recent downturn in oil prices?
What, if any, are the opportunities
that this decline offers?
The price of crude oil was $115 per
barrel (bbl) in June last year. Today it
has fallen to below $60 per bbl.This
decline was unanticipated. Prices
have fallen comparably sharply in the
past, but there has been an
explanatory external trigger each
time. Between 1997 and 1999, prices
fell from $25 per bbl to $10 per bbl.
The trigger was the Thai
government’s decision on June 30,
1997, to stop defending its currency.
This snowballed into the full-blown
Asian financial crisis. Between July
and December 2008, prices went from
$145 per bbl to $35 per bbl. Here, the
triggers were two-fold. First, prices
had run up to an unsustainable level
and second, investment bank Lehman
Brothers went belly up in September
and banks stopped lending. This time,
however, there has been no external
trigger. Prices have slid because
supplies have outrun demand.
The International Energy Agency (IEA)
had projected that oil demand would
rise by 1.4 million barrels a day in
2014 over 2013. But demand
increased by only half that amount —
7,00,000 barrels a day. On the supply
side, the US tight oil producers
(shale) exceeded production
expectations by 1 million barrels per
day (mbd), and Iraq and Libya by 200
and 300 thousand barrels per day,
respectively. In addition, Opec passed
the baton of “swing producer” of oil
to the US. Instead of cutting
production to defend prices, it
decided to defend market share. To
close observers of the petroleum
market, this shift in policy should not
have come as a surprise.
For, in September 2013, Saudi
Arabia’s minister of petroleum had
said that US shale oil production
should become the “world’s new
swing producer of oil”. Later and all
through 2014, both he and the Opec
secretary general repeatedly made
clear that Opec would not play its
traditional role; that with its lower
cost reserve base it had the staying
power to withstand any price
pressure; and that US shale
producers should hold back
production if they did not wish to be
driven into an economic hole.
They knew that US producers could
not “cartelise” and buck competitive
forces, so these statements were
deliberate signals to alert the market
of their altered attitudinal stance. So
when, at the Opec summit meeting in
November, they rolled over the
output quotas of individual members
unchanged, the price of crude
slithered sharply.
Opec is gambling that it will not be
long before US production stagnates
and that, with faster growth in the
US, China and India, the current price
trend will reverse. This is a gamble,
because there is an eight-month lag
before drilling activity responds to
price signals. Also, the price point at
which the marginal costs of shale
production exceed marginal revenues
is not clear.
The IEA has estimated that 4 per cent
of US shale production will be
uneconomic at prices below $80 per
bbl. Wood Mackenzie has written that
60 per cent of production from new
wells are commercial at $60 per bbl.
Cambridge Energy Research
Associates has calculated the average
break-even cost to be in the
mid-2050s. This variance is
understandable. It reflects the
different cost profiles of the
companies. Those that came into the
game early and leased land at
knockdown prices and have
established the required drilling
infrastructure can probably make
money at prices below even $50 per
bbl. Others must already be
struggling.
The important point is that while the
shale business model is clearly under
stress, oil producers are also hurting.
The Russian currency is in near
freefall; Venezuela is finding it
difficult to service its debt; Iran
needs $135 per bbl for fiscal break-
even. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
Kuwait have seen their revenues
decline by approximately $240 billion.
The Brazilian pre-salt fields are fast
becoming uneconomic. The Opec
position is a gamble because if prices
stay at this level for long, or slide
even further, most of these countries
will face an economic, if not political,
convulsion.
The implications for India are, of
course, on balance hugely positive. It
has saved approximately $40 billion
in reduced import costs; inflationary
pressures have eased; the subsidy
outgo has reduced and growth has
got a boost. But there is a flipside.
Indian companies have substantive
investment, trading and financial
interests in Venezuela, Russia,
Nigeria and the Gulf. Were Venezuela
to renege on its debt, Russia to sink
deeper into recession, Nigeria to
impose capital controls, Iran to suffer
a political upheaval and the Gulf
countries to cut back on public
expenditure, the returns on these
investments would be at risk,
remittances from Indian workers
would slow down, and our strategic
and trading relationships may have to
be reviewed.
At the sectoral level, it will be
increasingly difficult to attract risk
capital into oil and gas exploration.
This is because most oil companies
have pared down their exploration
budgets. The government is
reportedly planning to announce a
new licensing round for bidding. If
so, and if it is keen to attract
international companies, it will have
to abandon all thoughts of replacing
the current cost-recovery production-
sharing model (where companies
have first call on production to
recover costs) with a revenue-sharing
model (where revenues are shared
with the government even before
costs have been recovered).
The oil price decline raises two
questions. First, does it offer
acquisition opportunities? After all,
many international companies with
attractive assets are hugely leveraged
and face a cash crunch. They may well
need to sell at significant discounts.
Indian companies with deep pockets
and/ or sovereign backing should
perhaps investigate.
Second, at what point and under
what circumstances will prices start
to climb again? That they will is a
lesson from history. In anticipation,
the government should develop
scenarios that describe alternative
futures under different, albeit higher,
price points and be ready with its
policy response.

The writer is executive director,
Brookings India and senior fellow,
Brookings Institution

Making ‘Make in India’ happen

To become a manufacturing nation,
India has to quickly move beyond
rhetoric to create a clear strategy
and favourable policy environment
for manufacturing to take off. A
close dialogue and partnership
between government and the private
sector is critical
At this moment, the Prime Minister’s
“Make in India” campaign appears to
be exactly this — an imaginative
marketing campaign. But there is
much thought and even more work
that is required to convert this to
reality.
The theory behind “Make in India” is
as simple as it is compelling. India
must become a manufacturing
powerhouse in order to gainfully
employ its demographic dividend;
there is no choice here. Fortunately,
we have many natural advantages
including a big labour pool and a
large domestic market. In addition,
with China’s competitive advantage
in manufacturing eroding, India has
the opportunity to take some share
of global manufacturing away from
China. All we have to do to improve
the ease of doing business in India
are these —stop tax terrorism,
improve infrastructure, reform
labour laws, invest in skills
development, make it easier to
acquire land, implement Goods and
Services Tax (GST) and fast track
approvals. Voila, we will take our
rightful place as the world’s factory
alongside China.
Also read: Come, Make In India
Energy factor
This is an attractive thesis that has a
lot of merit. A simple step of making
it easier to do business will make a
huge difference to India’s
manufacturing competitiveness. It is
one plank of a manufacturing
strategy. India ranks 142 on the
World Bank Index; China is ranked
90. If we were to improve by just 50
places, it would be a huge
perceptual breakthrough. However,
this is not a manufacturing strategy
in itself. As Reserve Bank of India
(RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan
correctly and controversially pointed
out, much has changed in the world
since China elbowed itself into
becoming the world’s factory two
decades ago. The nature of
manufacturing is changing. Low-cost
automation and robotics are making
pure labour cost arbitrage less
important. Lead times and a
flexibility of supply chains are far
more important, leading many
companies to move manufacturing
back closer to the big markets, the
United States and Europe. Energy is
the new labour in the sense that the
cost of energy will significantly drive
where things are made. Here, the
U.S. with its huge new shale gas
reserves has a big advantage.
Developed countries are also
realising how crucial local
manufacturing is to jobs and to
having stable, prosperous societies
and so there is an attempt to reverse
outsourcing and revive local
manufacturing by embracing new
technologies and innovations such
as 3-D printing and the “Internet of
things”.
For an industrial policy
To become a manufacturing
powerhouse, India needs a
manufacturing strategy, otherwise
known as industrial policy. The idea
of an industrial policy is out of
vogue these days. It is seen as
ineffective at best and even
retrograde, running contrary to the
idea of free trade. This is patent
nonsense. Japan, Korea, China,
Germany have all prospered by
having a clear industrial policy and
vigorously implementing it. The U.S.,
the United Kingdom, France and
Italy have seen themselves
deindustrialise by not having a clear
industrial policy and are trying hard
to course-correct this mistake.
Read: Soft power, hard choices
There is a successful precedent even
in India; our success in IT services
was not an accident. It was the
result of clear-eyed policies driven
by the Department of Electronics,
which included reducing import
tariffs on hardware and software to
zero, setting up software technology
parks with tax incentives, and
improving connectivity. Policy has
always mattered and when it comes
to manufacturing competitiveness,
India must have a clear industrial
policy that spells out priority sectors
and how we will build competitive
advantage in a way that is consistent
with our obligations to the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Building on advantages
India’s industrial policy must
recognise where we have important
competitive advantages. India is
quite uncompetitive at low skill
manufacturing. On the other hand, it
is good at making complex things
which require skilled labour and
frugal engineering. Despite all its
shortcomings, India remains a very
competitive manufacturing location
for sophisticated things such as
construction machinery, cars and
automotive components and diesel
engines. It is no accident that
companies such as JCB, Cummins,
Deere, Volvo, Hyundai and Ford are
using India as a major export hub.
We must focus on building
competitive advantage and global
scale in sectors where we have a
large domestic market and certain
inherent capabilities. Strategy is all
about making choices. Here, five
priority industries come to mind.
Defence, because we are the world’s
leading arms importer. Localising
what we buy as a condition for all
defence deals along with a
willingness to allow majority foreign
ownership can turbocharge our local
defence industry. The second critical
industry is electronics hardware.
India imports $45 billion of mobile
phones, computers and
communications hardware; by 2020,
this is projected to grow to $300
billion and exceed our oil import
bill. This is unsustainable. We have
to create policy incentives to create a
local electronic hardware
manufacturing ecosystem. Since
most component suppliers, Original
Equipment Manufacturers and
Original Design Manufacturers are
Chinese, this will necessarily imply
incentivising Chinese companies to
establish factories in India. The size
of our domestic market should make
this possible. Concerns about
security are misplaced; all our
personal computers, cellphones and
a lot of switches and routers are
already made in China, so we are
conceding nothing. The third
industry is construction. India will
invest a trillion dollars over the
coming years in improving
infrastructure. We need to create
incentives that not only spur
investment in manufacturing
materials such as cement and steel
but also construction equipment,
locomotives, power generation
equipment and so on. Everything we
install should be made in India. The
fourth is health care. India’s generic
pharmaceutical industry is world
class. We must not concede on
intellectual property rights that
neutralise our advantage. India is
also exceedingly good at frugal
innovation in medical devices such
as low cost X-ray and ECG machines.
We have a real shot at being a world
leader in innovation and
manufacturing in this space. Finally,
agro-industries. We are one of the
largest agricultural nations. A third
of what we grow just rots and spoils.
Investing in agro-industries such as
food processing and establishing a
reliable cold chain would make a
huge difference in terms of rural
employment and food security. If we
had to pick just five industries where
we want to bootstrap a strong
competitive advantage it would be
these. In other industries, whether it
be textiles, toys, or automotive, we
need to ensure that we do not
disadvantage local manufacturing.
Read: Hurdles to ‘Make in India’
Creating ecosystems
Another critical strategic question is
this: where do we want to make
things? It is difficult to make a
country the size of India into a
uniformly attractive manufacturing
location. Even China started its
manufacturing odyssey by creating a
few oases in the form of four special
economic zones which were
remarkably easy places to
manufacture in. Where is India going
to start its global odyssey?
Manufacturing is all about hubs that
are ecosystems for innovation,
specialised skills and supply chains.
Where will India’s hubs be for
pharma, for defence, for electronics,
for machinery and construction
equipment? How do we catalyse
these hubs by creating world-class
academic institutions and skills
training institutes? What incentives
will attract the world’s leading
companies to establish global
innovation and manufacturing
centres in these hubs? Pune,
Chennai, Bengaluru and Delhi are
already emergent hubs but what will
enable them to scale up to compete
with Shenzen and Tianjin?
To become a manufacturing nation,
India has to quickly move beyond
rhetoric to create a clear strategy
and favourable policy environment
for manufacturing to take off. The
government has chosen to quietly
dismantle the sclerotic National
Manufacturing Competitiveness
Council (NMCC) but it needs to foster
a more vibrant think tank in its
place. A close dialogue and
partnership between government and
the private sector, both domestic
and foreign, is critical. Indian
companies along with Chinese,
Japanese, German, American and
Swedish companies are all vital
partners and we must create an
environment that is open and
welcoming. For this, the right
leadership of this vital mission is
critical. There is a clear and short-
lived window of opportunity to
become a manufacturing nation. We
must not squander it.
(Ravi Venkatesan is the former
Chairman of Microsoft India and
Cummins India and an author of
Conquering the Chaos: Win In India,
Win Everywhere.)

Tuesday, 6 May 2014

Low carbon future

Tackle climate change before it's too late: UN chief http://toi.in/d0Zc0Z @timesofindia

National working plan code 2014

Government plans fresh socio-economic survey of forest dwellers http://toi.in/k9kKUY @timesofindia